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Espionage: Anything Goes?
I. INTRODUCTION
The word "spy" immediately evokes an image of a James Bond 007
type of character. The picture is not complete, however, without the
addition of some secret mission in a faraway country. The country
could be any one; but, if Mr. Bond is involved, it is likely to be China
or the Soviet Union since communism is most often equated with the
"bad guys." Suppose while Mr. Bond is on a mission in Moscow he is
seized by the KGB. They accuse him of spying and throw him in a
Soviet jail pending prosecution. There is a good chance the British
government will be minus one spy. Or will they?
Would the picture be any different if Bond was working for the
United States government? And, what if Bond was not actually a
spy, but was a foreign news correspondent, instead, who was in the
unfortunate predicament of having KGB secret documents planted
on him? Now, switch things around a bit. Suppose the KGB has
planted Soviet Intelligence Officer Mr. James Bondinov in the Soviet
consulate in San Francisco to work as a diplomat. While carrying out
his diplomatic functions, he also oversees clandestine operations for
the KGB in the Silicon Valley. If Mr. Bondinov is discovered by the
FBI, what will happen to him?
This comment will attempt to answer some of these questions as
well as explore and unveil the underlying factors which affect the
outcome of espionage cases. Unlike other crimes classified as felo-
nies, political issues become intermingled with the legal issues when
espionage is involved. Dissimilar treatment of individuals who have
been accused of violating the same espionage laws in the United
States leads one to question what legal standards are applied, if any,
and why.
II. ESPIONAGE DEFINED
United States statutes do not define espionage or spying per se.
However, sections 792 through 799 of the Espionage Act prohibit spe-
cific acts.1 Section 792 generally provides that one shall not harbor
or conceal persons known to have committed or about to commit an
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1983).
offense under sections 793 or 794 of Title 18.2 Offenses under section
793 include gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information
that may be used to injure the United States, or used to the advan-
tage of any foreign nation.3 Section 794 prohibits the gathering or de-
livering of defense information to aid foreign governments.4 This
section imposes the strictest penalty: death or imprisonment for any
term of years or life.5 Other acts prohibited include: section 795, the
photographing and sketching of defense installations when such have
been designated by the President as requiring protection against gen-
eral dissemination;6 section 796, the use or granting use of an aircraft
for the purpose of accomplishing acts made illegal by section 795;7
section 797, the sale or publication of photographs of said defense in-
stallations8 without special permission;9 and section 798, the disclo-
sure of classified information.lO Finally, section 799 pertains to
violations of the regulations of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration."
It would appear that an individual charged with violating any of
these sections of the Espionage Act and subsequently indicted would
be prosecuted. The natural alternatives would be to impose on the
individual whatever sentence the Act provides, if convicted, or to re-
lease him, if found innocent. Unfortunately, the nature of espionage
cases prevents such straightforward handling of an individual accused
of spying. There are underlying, as well as obvious, factors which the
government will necessarily consider. These factors determine
whether or not the arrest of an alleged spy will be followed by prose-
cution, or whether a convicted spy will actually serve the time
sentenced.
III. FACTORS INVOLVED
The political or diplomatic status of an accused is one of the most
important factors in determining the treatment to be accorded him or
her.12 Communist countries frequently assign intelligence officers to
2. 18 U.S.C. § 792 (1983).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1983).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1983).
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 795 (1983).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 795-796 (1983).
8. Those designated by the President as requiring protection from general
dissemination.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 797 (1983).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1983).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 799 (1983).
12. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
ESPIONAGE, MEETING THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE: A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS (Comm. Print October 7, 1986)
[hereinafter THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE].
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the United States as diplomats, journalists, trade representatives, stu-
dents, scientists, visitors, and in other capacities. 13 The intelligence
service with which the accused is connected is also an important
question.
Among foreign intelligence services, those of the Soviet Union represent by
far the most significant intelligence threat in terms of size, ability and intent
to act against U.S. interests. In fact, the activities of the Warsaw Pact country
[sic] and Cuban intelligence services are primarily significant to the degree
that they support the objectives of the Soviets. The threat from intelligence
activities by the People's Republic of China (PRC) is significant but of a dif-
ferent character.... The intelligence activities of North Korea, Vietnam and
Nicaragua pose a lesser, but still significant, threat to U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests, although these countries have only a limited official presence in the
United States.1 4
Within the Soviet Union, the KGB (Committee for State Security)
and the GRU (Chief Directorate for Intelligence) are the two princi-
pal intelligence organizations.15 The KGB acts as a secret intelli-
gence service maintaining internal security, collecting intelligence
information, and conducting covert political influence operations. 16
The GRU is the Soviet military intelligence organization and engages
only in foreign intelligence activities.17 Both contribute to the hostile
intelligence activities directed at the United States and its allies.' 8
This hostile intelligence threat "is divided roughly between the
human side and the wide array of technical collection operations."19
Because the Soviet Union poses the greatest threat to U.S. interests
through their intelligence operations, this article will focus primarily
on those specific operations as implemented through the human
dimension.
13. Id. at 137.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id.
16. Id. Covert political influence operations are termed "active measures." See J.
BARRON, KGB TODAY: THE HIDDEN HAND (1983).
17. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, at 24.
18. Id. "In recent years, the KGB has become a vital tool for protecting the Com-
munist Party at home [as well as in] implementing its policies worldwide." Id. The
Soviet Union disseminates its influence through energetic espionage and covert action
operations. "Covert action efforts are coordinated with the Internal Department of
the Communist Party, which has lead responsibility for worldwide Soviet 'active meas-
ures' including propaganda and political influence operations." Id. The GRU coordi-
nates overhead photography, trains foreign revolutionary cadres and insurgents, and
supplements the KGB with espionage and massive technical surveillance operations.
Id.
19. Id. at 28.
IV. THE HUMAN DIMENSION
"The human dimension begins with the trained intelligence officer,
dispatched under official or nonofficial cover to operate abroad."20
These "intelligence officers recruit and handle agents who are em-
ployed by foreign governments, industries, or political organiza-
tions."2 1  Additionally, they "co-opt" other Soviet citizens for
particular assignments.22 These "human intelligence operations"
have been divided into four categories. 2 3
The first category consists of "legal" operations.24 These opera-
tions are conducted by intelligence officers under official cover. A
prime example is the Soviet diplomat placed in the embassy in Wash-
ington, D.C., or in the consulate in San Francisco, or perhaps in the
United Nations in New York, who is also a KGB or GRU staff officer.
Although the term "legal" is used here, it is not synonymous with
"lawful," because these officers are participating in and inciting espi-
onage activities.25
The problem inherent in this first group of "spies" involves the im-
munity which these individuals generally possess. Historically, diplo-
matic agents have had absolute prosecutorial immunity.26 The
rationale behind this rule is that the diplomatic agent is not consid-
20. Id. at 28-29.
21. Id. at 29. Note the specified targeted areas: Government, politics, and technol-
ogy (industry).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Absolute diplomatic immunity can be found embodied in the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 29, 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502,
500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention
states: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to
any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect
and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or
dignity." Id. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and adminis-
trative jurisdiction, except in cases of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the terri-
tory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State
for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved
as executor, administrator, heir, or legatee as a private person and not on be-
half of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent
except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph
1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken with-
out infringing the inviolability of his person or his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving
State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State.
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ered to be under the legal authority of the receiving State's criminal
jurisdiction.27 Because "[c]onfidentiality and secrecy [have been
deemed] necessary requisites for effective diplomatic relations, [a dip-
lomatic agent possesses] the perfect guise for espionage. ' 28 Thus, the
Soviet Union is able to send over its foreign agents, cloaked with the
prosecutorial immunities extended to diplomats, to engage in clan-
destine activities far beyond the scope of their diplomatic duties. If
apprehended, they need not fear prosecution due to the protection ac-
corded them through diplomatic immunity.29 As long as the individ-
ual is successful in asserting this defense, only one action can be
taken against him: He will be declared persona non grata3o and de-
ported to the sending State.31 However, if diplomatic immunity is
not sustained under articles 29 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations 32 or under the Diplomatic Relations Act of
1978,33 the accused will be tried as any other defendant.34
The second category of the "human intelligence operations" is com-
prised of "illegals." 35 This particular classification of "spy" originated
because, historically, many nations denied the Soviet Union diplo-
matic recognition during the early years of its existence. Soviet intel-
ligence officers could therefore only enter and live in these nations
illegally. "Of necessity, Soviet intelligence perfected the art of train-
Id. Thus, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, a diplomatic agent always has
immunity.
27. Note, A Comparison and Analysis of Immunities Defenses Raised by Soviet
Nationals Indicted Under United States Espionage Laws, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 259,
264-65 (1980).
28. Id. at 261.
29. Id. See also Welch, Classified Information and the Courts, 31 FED. B. J. 360,
361 (1972).
30. "In international law and diplomatic usage, a person not acceptable... to the
court or government to which it is proposed to accredit him in the character of an am-
bassador or minister." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (5th ed. 1979).
31. See generally The Vienna Convention, art. 29 (stating the procedure involved
when an individual loses diplomatic status).
32. See supra note 26.
33. 22 U.S.C. 254(a) (1982). This United States statute presently governs diplo-
matic immunity in the United States. The Act repealed the Diplomatic Immunity
Statute, 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-254 (1958).
34. One may also be immune from prosecution if he possesses "functional immu-
nity." Functional immunity accorded to members of international organizations is the
counterpart to full immunity accorded to diplomatic agents. If a person is performing
tasks which are within his proper field of endeavor, that person is accorded immunity.
See Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations
Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities
of Diplomatic Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1976).
35. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 29.
ing men and women to assume fictitious foreign identities and to
function as normal citizens in alien societies."3 6 Currently, "illegals"
are trained intelligence officers sent abroad, usually with false identi-
ties, who maintain no overt contact with their government. Because
of their completely clandestine manner of operation, the number of
Soviet illegals and their activities are very difficult to ascertain.3 7
When an "illegal" is apprehended, prosecution is unlikely. This is
due to the immeasurable value of their services to our government
when some sort of "deal" can be worked out. A case example is that
of Colonel Rudolf Hermann.38 In 1977, Colonel Hermann, a KGB il-
legal agent, was living in New York with his family when he was
identified by the FBI. Colonel Hermann, who had been with the
KGB for twenty-five years, illegally entered the United States in
1968. With his wife Inga, and sons Peter and Michael by his side, he
established a home and a successful career as a freelance photogra-
pher. He did not directly collect classified information, but rather he
performed support functions such as locating drop sites for other
agents and spotting potential recruits. He was prepared to conduct
more active collection operations in the event of the expulsion of So-
viet officials in time of crisis or war. His son Peter also had plans to
work as an "illegal." Under KGB orders, his son Peter enrolled in
Georgetown law school in preparation to seek United States govern-
ment employment (hopefully in a sensitive position).3 9
When the FBI approached Colonel Hermann on May 2, 1977, they
gave him two choices. The first choice was the arrest and prosecution
of himself, his wife Inga, and son Peter. The three would be headed
for long prison terms since no immunity would be accorded them. 40
Colonel Hermann's second choice was to become a United States con-
trolled double agent, working in partnership with the FBI against the
KGB. In turn, Colonel Hermann and his family would be relocated
and supplied with new identities, as well as guaranteed security. The
FBI had been aware of Colonel Hermann's operations for several
years, and had compiled documentary, photographic, and material ev-
idence against him.41 The FBI's apprehension of him at this particu-
lar point in time was not happenstance. It was strategically planned
to coincide with a time when Hermann felt disappointed and discour-
aged with the KGB. As this was the case in 1977, Colonel Hermann
36. J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 247.
37. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 29.
38. Id. at 35. See also J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 247-301.
39. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 29.
40. See Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Sabo-
teurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 323-45 (1951); Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity
for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 53-75 (1984).
41. J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 301. The FBI has not revealed exactly how it dis-
covered Rudolf Hermann and his operations.
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opted for freedom over loyalty to the KGB. Thus, in Colonel Her-
mann's case, as with any exposed "illegal," the benefits to national
security as a result of his cooperation greatly outweighed implement-
ing standard procedures of prosecution and imprisonment.
The third category designated by the Senate Committee is that of
"co-optees." 42 "Co-optees" are officials or visitors assigned to do par-
ticular tasks, such as spotting potential recruits or servicing drops.
Many Soviet officials are co-opted, as are many official visitors and
emigres.
Some 2,000 Soviets come to the United States each year under the auspices of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Trade, the State Committee
for Foreign Economic Relations, and other Soviet agencies. They collect not
only overt information for nondefense industries, but also classified and pro-
prietary data, in response to intelligence tasking [sic] on behalf of military re-
search projects. The number of U.S. universities and institutes subject to
focused Soviet efforts reportedly increased from 20 to over 60 from the late
1970's to the early 1980's.4 3
There are no solid case examples to be found of "co-optees." These
individuals are generally in the United States for only a short period
of time with perhaps one specific assignment. If and when a violation
of the espionage laws is discovered, the "co-optee" will most likely be
back home in the Soviet Union out of United States jurisdiction.
The final category of human intelligence operations consists of
those persons who have been recruited by the Soviet Union as
"agents." "'Agents' are American or third country nationals re-
cruited for current operational purposes or, in some cases, as 'sleep-
ers' to be activated at a later date."44 Since these agents are usually
United States citizens, the standard procedure of prosecution and im-
position of criminal penalties occurs more readily than with the first
three mentioned categories.
One of the more recent and highly publicized cases involving such
an "agent" was that of Richard Miller.45 Miller was the first FBI
agent ever charged with and convicted of espionage. He was arrested
by fellow agents at his home in Northern San Diego County on Octo-
ber 2, 1984, and charged with seven counts of espionage for passing
FBI counterintelligence guidelines to the Soviets. He was convicted
on June 19, 1986 on six counts of espionage following a lengthy
42. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 29.
43. Id. at 34.
44. Id. at 29.
45. See Girdner, Spy v. Spy, 6 CAL. LAW. 26 (1986) (citing United States v. Miller,
No. CR 84-972(A)-KN (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
trial.46 In Miller's case, diplomatic immunity was inapplicable; thus,
there were no offers of freedom in exchange for cooperation and in-
formation. Instead, Miller received two life prison terms plus an-
other fifty years, as well as a sixty-thousand dollar fine. 47
A similar instance occurred in 1981, when two "agents" who had
done much damage to the United States, and were of great benefit to
the Soviet Union, were arrested. William Holden Bell was a project
manager in the Advanced Systems Division Radar Systems Group at
Hughes International Corporation.48 His responsibilities included de-
velopment and promotion of the radar fire control product line of ve-
hicles.49 Bell's arrest was a great shock to many people who "knew
him as a model husband and father, a good and friendly neighbor,
who looked after their children as well as his own stepson."50
In 1977, Polish intelligence officer Marian Zacharski5 l began his se-
duction of Bell. This particular case demonstrates the techniques
used in recruiting "agents," as well as the type of person who be-
comes a target for the KGB. "The employment of foreign nationals
in U.S. establishments... affords hostile security services the oppor-
tunity to conduct a variety of observations of U.S. personnel and
technical penetrations of U.S. facilities."52 The KGB uses the foreign
national's personal observations to assess possible recruitment targets
among American personnel, as well as to try to identify U.S. intelli-
gence officers. Typically, the modern day "spy" is motivated more by
greed than by other things like ideological and political beliefs. Job
dissatisfaction is another common motivator. Thus, in its search for
targets, the KGB looks for individuals with financial difficulties, job
dissatisfaction, family problems, or even alcohol and drug addictions.
William H. Bell was a prime target.
At the time Bell met Zacharski, he was divorced, bankrupt, and
had lost his 18-year-old son in a recent tragic accident. By 1981 Bell
was supplying Zacharski with extensive intelligence, specifically,
46. Miller's first trial ended in November of 1985 with the jury deadlocked 11-1, or
10-2 in favor of conviction on the various charges. See L.A. Daily J., July 15, 1986, at 1,
col. 4; Girdner, supra note 45.
47. See L.A. Daily J., July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (citing United States v. Miller, No.
CR 84-972(A)-KN (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
48. United States v. Zacharski, No. CR 81-679-KN (S.D. Cal. filed 1981); United
States v. Bell, CR 81-679-KN (S.D. Cal. filed 1981)).
49. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 18; see also J. BARRON, supra
note 16, at 160-68.
50. J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 167.
51. Marian Zacharski lived in William Bell's apartment complex which was lo-
cated in Playa del Rey, California. When Zacharski was introduced to Bell, he told
Bell that he was the West Coast manager of Polamco, a Chicago company that im-
ported and exported industrial machinery. Although Bell at first assumed the com-
pany was American, it was in fact owned by the Polish government. J. BARRON, supra
note 16, at 162.
52. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 36.
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classified documents concerning defense information of prime impor-
tance. 53 On June 23, 1981, FBI agents were waiting at Hughes Air-
craft for Bell to report to work. Bell confessed to the FBI and
ultimately agreed to help gather additional information against
Zacharski. "On June 28, wearing a body microphone, he recorded a
clandestine conversation with his friend that further and conclusively
proved their guilt."5 4 For his violations of espionage law, Bell was
potentially subject to a ten year prison term and a ten-thousand dol-
lar fine.55 Because of his cooperation with the government, he was
given only an eight year sentence. Zacharski, however, violated sec-
tion 794 of the Espionage Act, which provides for a sentence of death,
life, or a term of years.5 6 He was subsequently sentenced to life im-
prisonment and denied all appeals. In Zacharski's case, no deals were
"worked out." The United States resisted Soviet attempts at a pris-
oner exchange and various other attempts to extricate Zacharski.57
In analyzing the end result of Zacharski's case, one could draw the
conclusion that strict legal principles were adhered to, since both per-
sons were fully prosecuted and are now serving time. But, this is not
necessarily so. If the damage caused by Zacharski to United States
national security had been minimal, and if Soviet-U.S. relations
would have suffered substantially due to his detainment, the United
States probably would have conditionally released Zacharski to the
Soviets. Bell's situation, on the other hand, would in all likelihood
have remained the same.
A final example of a recruited "agent" is the case of James Dur-
ward Harper.S8 Harper was accused of violating section 794 by "ob-
taining secret national defense information and knowingly and
willfully transmitting it to an officer of the Polish Intelligence Ser-
vice with intent and reason to believe that the information would be
53. Id. at 18; see also J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 167. According to the CIA, the
information in those documents jeopardized existing weapons of the United States and
its allies:
The acquisition of this information will save the Polish and Soviet govern-
ments hundreds of millions of dollars in R & D efforts by permitting them to
implement proven designs developed by the United States and by fielding op-
erational counterpart systems in a much shorter time period. Specifications
will enable them to develop defensive countermeasures systems.
J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 167 (quoting a CIA study which was submitted to the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations).
54. J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 167.
55. Nat'l L. J., Nov. 9, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
57. J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 167.
58. United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1984).
used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of the
Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics."5 9 He was also charged with unlawfully obtaining national de-
fense information in violation of section 793(b), and unlawfully
retaining national defense information in violation of section 793(e).6 0
"Harper received approximately $250,000 for documents whose loss
army experts have rated as 'beyond calculation.' "61 His largest sin-
gle delivery took place in 1980 when he transported some one-hun-
dred pounds of classified reports to Warsaw. There, a team of KGB
experts received them and subsequently declared them to be of ex-
treme value.62
In a pretrial order, the United States District Court for Northern
California held that the death penalty provision of Title 18 section
794 was constitutional. Both parties to the case (the government and
defendant Harper) appealed the order. In reversing the decision, Cir-
cuit Judge Reinhardt noted that since both the government and the
defendant felt that the district court erred with respect to an impor-
tant matter within the criminal trial there was a stronger than nor-
mal basis to invoke the court's discretionary authority.63 The second
factor the court noted was that the case involved sensitive matters of
national security. "During the course of an espionage trial the gov-
ernment may be compelled to disclose information that jeopardizes
intelligence sources or even compromises national security. The in-
terest of the government--and of the public-in disposing of such
cases without trial is particularly strong."6 4
The spectre of a possible death penalty may influence a defendant
to plead guilty in the hope of obtaining a lesser sentence. This would
serve the government's interest in avoiding a public trial. However,
this is not the purpose of the death penalty provision. The constitu-
tionality of the statute's death penalty provision should not be upheld
on these grounds.
The court further reasoned that if the case were to go to trial, the
government's interest would be that of having a prompt and efficient
trial, for the same national security reasons. The court then noted
the adverse effect that a potential death sentence would have on the
trial:
Where a potential death sentence is at stake, the trial is likely to be longer
and more complex, and to involve a large number of bitterly-fought legal is-
sues. Obtaining a conviction may be more difficult when execution is a possi-
ble end result, and the prosecution may feel compelled to release even more
59. Id. at 1217-18.
60. Id. at 1218 n.2.
61. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 18.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d at 1223-24.
64. Id. at 1224.
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sensitive information than it might otherwise have to disclose.6 5
Thus, by removing the question of execution, the government's na-
tional security interests properly played a major role in the actual
prosecution of Harper.
V. PROSECUTION OF A SPY
Whether or not prosecution will actually occur when an individual
has been arrested on espionage charges often depends upon which
category of the "human dimension" he falls within. The category of
"legals" can be immediately put aside since these persons will be af-
forded diplomatic immunity and are therefore protected from prose-
cution.66 "Illegals," "co-optees," and "agents" are not granted such
immunity. These three categories consist essentially of "spies in dis-
guise."67 Arguably, it is those persons acting in disguise or under
false pretenses who are the "real" spies. 6 8 Historically and presently,
international law has deliberately neglected to protect these "un-
privileged belligerents" because of the danger their acts present to
their opponents. 69 "The soldier in uniform or the member of the vol-
unteer corps with his distinctive sign have a protected status upon
capture, whilst other belligerents not so identified do not benefit
from any comprehensive scheme of protection." 70
Historically, this "clothes philosophy" was applied to soldiers who
were prisoners of war in determining whether their sentences should
be life or death.71 Although the Hague Regulations72 ensure that a
spy will be entitled to a trial, he will not enjoy any privileges af-
forded to a prisoner of war.73 Presently, in peacetime, spies who are
65. Id.
66. If the person has "diplomatic" status, he will be accorded "absolute" diplo-
matic immunity and will thus be afforded protection whether or not he was acting
within his realm of duty. On the other hand, if he has only "functional" immunity,
then he must have been acting within the scope of his duties when he was arrested.
Functional immunity does not cloak those who are acting beyond the scope of their
duties. See Note, supra note 27, at 259-88; see also Note, Insuring Against Abuse of
Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1817 (1986).
67. Delupis, supra note 40, at 61.
68. Id. at 62.
69. See generally Baxter, supra note 41.
70. Id.
71. Id. International law has long provided for the treatment of spies: "[in war
they may be executed; in peacetime they may be punished as severely as the municipal
law prescribes." Id.
72. The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
On Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 29, 36 stat. 2277, 230, T.S. No. 539, at 647.
73. Delupis, supra note 40, at 62 n.56.
not in uniform (i.e., Colonel Rudolph Hermann, Richard Miller, and
James Harper) are subject to the penalties of the country in which
they are apprehended. The rationale for this "harsh" treatment of
spies is straightforward: "[S]pies are not agents of states for their dip-
lomatic relations, so that they cannot legally excuse themselves by
pleading that they were only following orders of the government."74
Consider the following illustration involving our fictitious James
Bondinov. Mr. Bondinov, a KGB intelligence officer, has come to the
United States as an "illegal." Shortening his last name to Bond, he
and his family have discretely moved into a small community in
northern California. The Bond family is the ideal picture of an all
American family. James Bond, through years of effort and persis-
tence, has obtained a position as a professor at Stanford University,
teaching industrial engineering. Meanwhile, Bond is gathering high
technology information to send to the Soviet Union, and participating
in other covert operations as well. Subsequently, Bond is appre-
hended by the FBI and is charged with violating Title 18 sections 793
and 794.7 5 Will prosecution follow? He has no diplomatic or official
74. Id. at 62.
75. While neither this statute, nor any other, defines espionage per se, section 793
prohibits certain activities which constitute espionage:
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national
defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to
the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes
upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning [any
thing] or... place connected with the national defense.., or under the con-
trol of the United States...; or
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to be-
lieve, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy . . . or obtain, any
sketch, photograph ... blueprint, plan, map, model,.. . document, writing or
note of anything connected with the national defense; or
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or at-
tempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever,
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph .... of any-
thing connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to be-
lieve, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or
obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by
any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being
entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photo-
graph .... blueprint, plan, map .... or note relating to the national defense...
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the in-
jury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated ... shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793 (1983). Section 794 proscribes "gathering or delivering information to
aid foreign governments":
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury
of the United States or the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, de-
livers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any
foreign government ... information relating to the national defense, shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1983).
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status; thus, no immunity. According to international law, he was
acting in disguise and is therefore subject to the laws and penalties of
the country in which he was arrested. Prosecution would appear to
be the next stage in the natural course of things. However, consider
the following cases.
In 1960, Igor Y. Melekh76 was charged with three ten-year counts
of espionage for violations of sections 793(a), (b), and (c). 7 7 He was
not charged under the provisions of section 794 which carry a penalty
of life imprisonment. The government successfully moved the court
to reduce the $50,000 bail, thereby enabling Melekh to leave the
country. The indictment was dismissed upon further motion by the
government.78
In 1970, the United States government charged Aleksandr Vasily-
evich Tikhomirov with violating section 793(b).79 The case never
reached the court due to its dismissal upon a government motion.
The government chose to dismiss the case on the grounds that con-
tinued prosecution would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.SO Thus, instead of being prosecuted and receiving a
possible ten year prison term, Tikhomirov was simply expelled from
the country.81
The same scenario took place with Valeriy Ivanovich Markelov.82
Markelov was a Soviet citizen employed by the United Nations. He
was indicted in 1972 on two counts of espionage, both carrying a ten
year prison term. As with Tikhomirov and Melekh, Markelov's in-
dictment was subsequently dismissed upon the prosecution's motion
in consideration of national security interests, which otherwise would
have been prejudiced.8 3
Thus, in each of these examples, the United States strongly be-
lieved that its national security would have been jeopardized if the
76. United States v. Kostadinov, 572 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 721
F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1981) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1982));
United States v. Igor Y. Melekh (N.D. Ill. 1960) (opinion unpublished due to classified
information).
77. Kostadinov, 572 F. Supp. at 1554.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing United States v. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Tikhomirov, (W.D. Wash.
1970) (opinion unpublished due to classified information)).
80. Id.
81. Id. Bail was posted for $75,000.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Valeriy Ivanovich Markelov, (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (opin-
ion unpublished due to classified information)).
83. Id. Bail was originally set at $500,000, but later reduced to $100,000 which was
posted. Id.
cases had gone to trial. This, of course, was due to the sensitive type
of information generally involved in espionage cases. In the past, a
favorite defense tactic in these kinds of cases was "graymail."8 4
"Graymail" is the use of discovery tactics that threaten disclosure of
classified information to force reduction or dismissal of the charges.8 5
A second obstacle in the path of prosecuting spies was the assump-
tion made for many years by United States counterintelligence offi-
cials that information acquired by intelligence techniques could not
be used for law enforcement purposes because of legal obstacles and
the need to protect sources and methods.86
These problems clearly reflect the principal difference between es-
pionage investigations and other criminal cases: the compelling need
for secrecy. In normal criminal cases, the objective, either immediate
or long-term, is always prosecution in open court. Counterintel-
ligence operations on the other hand have different objectives that
may be more strategically important, such as learning the methods of
the hostile service. According to a recent Senate Report,8 7 federal
law does not adequately take into account the inherent problems of
an espionage investigation. Nevertheless, congressional attempts and
recent legislation show that progress is being made in this area.
In 1978, Congress created a special secure court order procedure
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).88 Under
this Act, a uniform surveillance procedure was established for the
collection of foreign intelligence information by government officials.
Essentially, the Act provides that "[u]pon an affidavit filed by the
United States Attorney General stating that disclosure of the surveil-
lance materials would harm the country's security, the legality deter-
mination is made ex parte by a district court judge based upon an in
camera examination of the relevant materials."8 9 Such a method al-
lows violators of the espionage laws to be fully prosecuted and held
subject to the criminal penalties without fear of the disclosure of na-
tional security secrets during the trial process. Since the enactment
of FISA, United States intelligence capabilities have been greatly en-
84. Girdner, supra note 45, at 29.
85. Girdner, supra note 45, at 29.
86. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 78.
87. Id. at 79.
88. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982).
89. Comment, Constitutional Law-Foreign Intelligence-Determining the Legal-
ity of Foreign Electronic Surveillance in Ex Parte Proceeding is Constitutional, 7 SuF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 493, 493 (1983) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (1982)). "A judicial
proceeding... is said to be ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for
the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person ad-
versely interested." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979). In camera is
"either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private chambers or when all
spectators are excluded from the courtroom." Id. at 387.
[Vol. 14: 647, 1987] Espionage: Anything Goes?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
hanced.90 According to the Senate Committee on Intelligence, FISA
has "contributed directly to the protection of the constitutional rights
and privacy of U.S. persons."9 1
Another fairly recent statute which strives to effectuate this same
purpose is the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of
1980.92 CIPA allows prosecutors to argue that classified information
is not relevant to the defense; it allows judges in some cases to bar
defense lawyers from closed door preliminary hearings; and, it autho-
rizes prosecutors to turn over to the defense only summaries or ex-
cerpts of sensitive documents.93 As in FISA, the aim of the Act is to
prevent dangerous disclosures which pertain to our national security.
In so doing, CIPA places sizeable obstacles to be overcome in the de-
fense of an espionage case that may be difficult, if not impossible, to
surmount. San Francisco attorney Jerrold Ladar, who defended
James Harper, criticized CIPA for being over-protective. "It permits
the government to hide anything you want to talk about .. .
Ladar explained:
When you have a judge who believes there will be terrible, serious conse-
quences to disclosure, you get a series of rulings that prevent you from analyz-
ing whether the case is as monumentous as the prosecution claims, [or]
whether it's solid or so lame that it falls apart when you bang on it.95
Even so, both CIPA and FISA are designed to reach a proper balance
between the national security interests of the United States and the
privacy interests of its citizens, while enabling the government to
carry through with prosecution of an accused spy. With the protec-
tive cover of these laws surrounding any sensitive information that
may be involved in such a trial, the likelihood of prosecuting Mr.
Bondinov has increased from the time of Melekh, Tikhomirov, and
Markelov.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF PROSECUTION
Whether prosecution occurs may be of no consequence. Although
Mr. Bondinov may be of only minor importance in the hierarchy of
KGB operations, he is still a Soviet pawn. The Soviets want their
90. THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE, supra note 12, at 78.
91. Id. at 80.
92. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980).
93. Girdner, supra note 45, at 29.
94. Id. (quoting San Francisco attorney Jerrold Ladar, defense counsel for James
Harper).
95. Comment, supra note 89; see also S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977)
(discussing congressional statement regarding the need for such legislation).
KGB agents abroad to be continually assured that they will not "be
left twisting in the wind, should they get caught in the act." 96 More
often than not, the Soviets will strongly urge some sort of "trade-
off," and history has taught us that such "trade-offs" are not uncom-
mon occurrences.
One well known example is the case of Valdik Aleksindrovich En-
ger and Rudolph Petrovich Chernyayev, two Soviet spies who were
charged with conspiracy to violate United States espionage statutes.97
The defendants raised the defense of diplomatic immunity under
both U.S. law and basic principles of international law.98 The court
denied this claim due to the defendants' lack of diplomatic status.99
This was done notwithstanding two letters sent to the United States
by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States,
Anatolyh F. Dobrynin, in support of their diplomatic status. 0 0
Subsequently, a seemingly coincidental arrest was made in the So-
viet Union. The Soviets arrested Francis Jay Crawford, an American
businessman, on black market currency charges three weeks after
the arrest of Chernyayev and Enger.iOi The Soviets then suggested a
swap, which the U.S. strongly resisted due to their belief that Craw-
ford had been framed.1o2 Next, they convicted and sentenced Craw-
ford to a five year suspended sentence.'0 3 In the end, however, Enger
and Chernyayev spent little time in jail. After pressure from then
Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, the two spies were traded for five
Soviet dissidents.'0 4
An almost identical situation occurred eight years later. According
to United States officials, Gennady F. Zakharov, a Soviet citizen who
was employed by the United Nations Center for Science and Tech-
nology Development in New York, began his spy operations from the
minute he first arrived in the United States. 0 5 Almost four years af-
ter his arrival, Zakharov was arrested 06 by the FBI on spying
96. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
97. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D. N.J. 1978).
98. Id. at 495.
99. Id. at 507. The court denied defendants such status because defendants offered
no proof that either of them had performed any diplomatic functions for the Soviet
Union while in the United States; and even if such proof had been offered, the court
stated that the United States Department of State determination that the defendants
were not recognized as being entitled to diplomatic status would control the decision of
the court. See Note, supra note 27, at 270.
100. Note, supra note 27, at 268 (citing Enger, 472 F. Supp. at 495-96 (quoting Letter
to the court of Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States)).
101. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 8, col. 2.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1, at 8, col. 4.
104. Id. § 1, at 9, col. 1.
105. Id. § 1, at 1, col. 6.
106. "Zakharov's arrest came at a time when the Soviet espionage network had
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charges.107 Two weeks later, the Soviets seized U.S. News and World
Report correspondent Nicholas Daniloff and charged him with espio-
nage.1 08 The Soviets then demanded equal treatment for Daniloff
and Zakharov.109 The United States insisted that Daniloff be freed
immediately and that Zakharov had to stand trial.110 There was no
doubt that Zakharov was guilty of violating United States espionage
statutes"' while Daniloff was merely an innocent victim of a political
"tit for tat." Herein lies the real difficulty inherent in espionage
cases involving defendants who are citizens of another country, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union. Not only are legal implications present
when a Soviet citizen is charged with spying, but weighty political
considerations are also a factor.
The FBI decision to arrest Zakharov was relayed to senior State Department
officials and perhaps to Secretary of State George P. Schultz; to top intelli-
gence-agency officials, and to the chairmen of the House and Senate intelli-
gence committees. At the White House, John M. Poindexter, the President's
national security adviser, gave the go-ahead for the arrest.1 1 2
Apprehending a non-U.S. citizen suspected of espionage activities in-
volves burdensome political considerations that simply are not pres-
ent in the arrest of a thief or murderer.
In Zakharov's case, officials concluded that, "the benefits of arrest
and prosecution, including letting the Soviets know that such spying
efforts can and will be stopped, seemed to outweigh the possible risks
.... "113 Such a conclusion sounds good on paper, but in actuality it
taken a yearlong battering, beginning with the breakup of the Walker spy ring in the
U.S. and extending through a string of KGB defections." Id. § 1, at 9, col. 1.
107. Id. See also Church, Iceland Cometh, TIME, Oct. 13, 1986, at 26. In the case
that led to his arrest, an FBI affidavit states that in 1983 Zakharov approached a
Queens College computer science student in New York, professing to be a U.N. em-
ployee who would pay for "research time" on robotics and computer technology. The
student, known by the code name "Birg," immediately informed the FBI and later met
frequently with Zakharov, receiving money in return for supplying microfiches of un-
classified data, much of it stolen from libraries. In 1985, Birg went to work for a
Queen's company which produced unclassified provision components for military air-
craft engines and radars. Zakharov then began requesting documents from the com-
pany on its manufacturing. He also asked Birg to photocopy the first few pages of
operating manuals the company uses to make aircraft components. On May 10, 1986,
Zakharov struck a written agreement with Birg to obtain classified data for 10 years
and be paid according to the quantity and quality of information he fed the Soviets.
L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 8, col. 2-3.
108. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
109. Church, supra note 107, at 26.
110. Id. The U.S. suggested that Zakharov could later be exchanged for some
prominent Soviet dissidents.
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976).
112. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 8, col. 1-2.
113. Id. § 1, at 8, col. 2.
has little or no weight. Arguably, the media exposure that coincides
with the arrest of Soviet spies such as Zakharov and Enger will deter
the KGB from further pursuing their clandestine operations. But
this result is very doubtful. More likely, such arrests serve only as
slight impediments in Soviet covert operations. The results of the
Zakharov case exemplify this conclusion.
The United States government possessed clear and convincing evi-
dence that Gennady Zakharov had violated sections 793 and 794 of Ti-
tle 18.114 Section 793 provides for a maximum penalty of $10,000 or a
prison term of ten years."15 Violators of section 794 are subject to
punishment by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or
for life.1l6 Yet, none of these penalties were imposed on Zakharov.
Instead, he received a mere slap on the wrist. After much debate be-
tween Washington and Moscow, an agreement was reached. On an
October afternoon, Daniloff was informed that he was free to leave
Moscow immediately. The next day Gennady Zakharov appeared in
a Brooklyn courtroom, changed his previous not guilty plea to no
contest, and was told to get out of the United States within twenty-
four hours.117 There were two other sideline agreements: (1) the re-
lease of a Soviet dissident, Yuri Orlovll8 and his wife Irina Valitova,
who had been sentenced to internal exile in Siberia by the Soviet
Union; and (2) a two week stay of the expulsion of twenty-five Sovi-
ets assigned to the United Nations in New York.119
According to Time magazine, "American conservatives grumbled
that the deal amounted to the swap of an innocent hostage, Daniloff,
for a real spy, Zakharov ....,"120 However, administration officials
explained the "trade-offs" differently: "[T]he U.S. had secured the
release of Daniloff without any trial, while Zakharov had really been
exchanged for Dissident Orlov."'21 In looking beyond policy explana-
tions, and who was actually traded for whom, one thing remains cer-
tain: United States espionage laws were violated, yet, prosecution and
sanctions were not pursued. The end result, freedom for the accused,
will not likely deter further acts of espionage against the United
States.
114. See supra note 107.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (1976).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976).
117. Church, supra note 107, at 28.
118. Yuri Orlov, a physicist, had helped organize the first Helsinki Watch Group
which publicized Soviet violations of the human rights accords signed in the Finnish
capital in 1975. For that temerity, Orlov was imprisoned for seven years, ending in
1984, and then sent into "internal exile" in a remote village in Siberia. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 26-28.
120. Id. at 28.
121. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
"'When it comes to espionage, the rules are cited by the Soviets
only when they get caught. In short, there are no rules of the
game.' "122 In many aspects this reflects the present state of affairs
in espionage. Fortunately, this is not an altogether accurate
reflection.
There are existing "rules" in the form of laws. The Espionage Act
itself dates back to 1917. Additionally, there have been recent legisla-
tive measures to aid in the implementation of prosecution under the
espionage statutes. Yet, case examples demonstrate an absence of
consistent application of these existing laws. The cause of this incon-
sistency is attributed to numerous factors which are involved in espi-
onage cases. These factors include the status of an individual. If the
accused is a "legal," he may be automatically immune from prosecu-
tion. If, on the contrary, he is an "illegal" or perhaps an "agent," fur-
ther prosecution will depend on how much he knows, what country
he is from, and what type of information is involved in the case.
While the Espionage Act provides for punishment of espionage ac-
tivities, the contingencies abound. If the accused is or has become
knowledgeable of opposing intelligence operations, he may be able to
secure his freedom or a reduced sentence simply by cooperating with
the United States government. And, if the defendant is a citizen of
the United States, his chances of prosecution and imprisonment are
much greater than if he were a citizen of a foreign nation. If infor-
mation on a top security level is endangered by public disclosure in
an espionage prosecution, the case will probably be dismissed. Like-
wise, if political considerations override the need for maintaining
legal standards, a potential conviction may be given up in order to
grant the defendant automatic freedom and preserve foreign rela-
tions. In light of the recent onslaught of espionage activities with the
United States, the need for a new approach becomes apparent.
A reconciliation of interests between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches would be a good starting point. Although there is a
need for flexibility in matters concerning foreign policy, there is also
a need for consistent attitudes among the three governmental
branches toward our espionage laws. Cohesive, uniform application
of the laws should be the norm, rather than multifarious decisions
stemming from forced reactions to circumstance. The United States
should take a harder line toward enforcing our espionage laws
122. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 1, at 9, col. 2-3.
against violators from other countries. Unless combined efforts
among the three branches of government become directed toward a
more uniform treatment of spies, according to the respective laws,
the result may be that-with espionage-anything goes.
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